切换期刊

期刊栏目

刊期目次

查看全部 >

加入编委

期刊订阅

添加您的邮件地址以接收即将发行期刊数据：

当前位置：人文与社会科学学刊 > 2026年8月-2卷8期 > 文章详情

Open Access Article

产业补贴绩效评价机制的国际可解释性：规则压力、证据链构建与治理路径

Evidence Crisis, Process Confirmation, and Institutional Reconstruction of Higher Education Assessment in the Era of Generative Artificial Intelligence

作者：黎银霞

单位：广州商学院

卷期：2026年8月-2卷8期

DOI：10.70693/202607171377

页码：225-227

发布时间：2026-08-06

总浏览量：225

摘要

全球产业政策竞争加剧背景下，产业补贴、财政贴息、税收优惠、低成本融资、政府采购和土地电力优惠等政策工具被广泛用于支持战略产业、科技创新和产业链安全。与此同时，国际补贴审查逐渐从补贴存在性判断，转向补贴对象、企业级数据、市场份额变化和竞争影响评估。我国地方产业补贴在推动产业链补短板、培育新质生产力和促进区域招商中发挥了重要作用，但仍存在口径分散、绩效证据不足、穿透核验较弱和退出问责不清等问题。文章结合产业政策有效性、产业政策与竞争、技术溢出、补贴规则和预算绩效管理研究，提出产业补贴绩效评价应突出国际可解释性、过程可核验性和结果可审计性，并从全口径台账、五段式披露、五流合一核验、第三方审计和透明度报告等方面完善治理路径。

关键词

产业补贴；绩效评价；国际可解释；补贴透明度；预算绩效管理

Abstract

Against the background of intensified global industrial policy competition, industrial subsidies, interest subsidies, tax incentives, low-cost financing and government procurement have become important tools for supporting strategic industries and technological innovation. Meanwhile, international subsidy scrutiny is shifting from the existence of subsidies to firm-level data, market share changes and competitive effects. China's local industrial subsidies have supported industrial upgrading, but still face fragmented policy tools, insufficient performance evidence, weak penetrating verification and unclear exit accountability. This paper argues that industrial subsidy performance evaluation should strengthen international interpretability, process verifiability and result auditability, and proposes governance measures such as full-scope subsidy ledgers, staged performance disclosure, five-flow cross-verification, third-party auditing and transparency reports.

Keywords

industrial subsidy; performance evaluation; international interpretability; subsidy transparency; budget performance management

下载PDF

引用本文

黎银霞. 产业补贴绩效评价机制的国际可解释性：规则压力、证据链构建与治理路径[J]. 人文与社会科学学刊. 2026, 2 (8): 225-227. DOI: 10.70693/202607171377.

APA引用

黎银霞. (2026). 产业补贴绩效评价机制的国际可解释性：规则压力、证据链构建与治理路径. 人文与社会科学学刊, 2 (8), 225-227. https://doi.org/10.70693/202607171377

参考文献

[1] Aghion, P., Cai, J., Dewatripont, M., Du, L., Harrison, A., Legros, P. Industrial policy and competition[J]. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2015, 7(4): 1-32.
[2] Bloom, N., Schankerman, M., Van Reenen, J. Identifying technology spillovers and product market rivalry[J]. Econometrica, 2013, 81(4): 1347-1393.
[3] Criscuolo, C., Martin, R., Overman, H. G., Van Reenen, J. Some causal effects of an industrial policy[J]. American Economic Review, 2019, 109(1): 48-85.
[4] Juhász, R. Temporary protection and technology adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade[J]. American Economic Review, 2018, 108(11): 3339-3376.
[5] Rodrik, D. Green industrial policy[J]. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2014, 30(3): 469-491.
[6] Schmitz, H., Johnson, O., Altenburg, T. Rent management: The heart of green industrial policy[J]. New Political Economy, 2015, 20(6): 812-831.
[7] OECD. OECD MAGIC Database of Industrial Subsidies[R/DB]. Paris: OECD, 2026.
[8] World Trade Organization. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures[EB/OL]. 1994.
[9] European Union. Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market[EB/OL]. 2022.
[10] European Commission. Foreign Subsidies Regulation[EB/OL]. Brussels: European Commission.